As\u00a0Private Internet Access is\u00a0one of the oldest and most-used\u00a0US-based VPNs,\u00a0we hold a\u00a0responsibility to\u00a0provide\u00a0honest,\u00a0accurate, and historically contextualized\u00a0facts\u00a0that shed light on the realities of the global VPN market. In doing so,\u00a0we\u2019ll\u00a0demonstrate\u00a0that not only are US-based VPNs no worse off than VPNs based in other countries, but in many cases, US-based VPNs are\u00a0actually\u00a0more\u00a0<\/em>secure and private than their foreign counterparts.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n At a time when US-based VPNs were capturing much of the global VPN market, VPN providers in other countries needed to find a way to discredit their US competitors, many of whom were at the top. As it were, around this same time, there was a fair amount of focus in the media on US privacy violations happening at the National Security Agency (NSA), the likes of which were exposed by Edward Snowden1<\/sup>.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Several VPN companies and their affiliate partners seized the opportunity to claim that all the espionage taking place \u2013 by the NSA, other US government agencies, and a handful of allied countries \u2013 meant that US-based-digital-privacy providers were aligned with these spying parties,\u00a0either politically or technologically.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n As this happened during a time when the\u00a0general public\u00a0became aware\u00a0about widespread surveillance measures carried out by the NSA, CIA, and the FBI \u2013 under the guise of\u00a0counter-terrorism\u00a0(which many, including Private Internet Access, found to be invasive) \u2013 it was a simple stretch to\u00a0baselessly\u00a0assert that US VPNs were\u00a0in cahoots with\u00a0the US government.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n And\u00a0so,\u00a0this myth that US-based VPNs were inherently associated with the government became an easy one to sell, thanks to the sensationalist \u201creporting\u201d.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n It\u2019s worth highlighting that much of the documentation that was initially revealed by Snowden implicated many large US tech companies like Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, Apple, and others. It was shown that these companies all complied, in various degrees and methods, with lawful requests for user data from the US government. But very importantly, these companies worked in infrastructure and communications; none of them were digital privacy companies, none of them had a sole focus on data obfuscation, and none of them were VPNs.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Once a few publications began covering the\u00a0supposed dangers\u00a0of US-based digital privacy companies, more outlets began to\u00a0rehash\u00a0the same assertions they read elsewhere.\u00a0Eventually,\u00a0that\u00a0flawed\u00a0narrative\u00a0became mainstream. Non-US VPN companies and their online affiliates\u00a0were happy to perpetuate the\u00a0fearmongering\u00a0in order to\u00a0outperform their American competition.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nevertheless, with all this surveillance taking place, what did Snowden himself recommend2<\/sup> to combat these forces? Encryption and data obfuscation \u2013 the very thing that all VPN providers (and especially US-based VPN providers like PIA) are amazing at providing.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n If you\u2019ve read about the Five Eyes, Nine Eyes, and 14 Eyes\u00a0Alliances, you\u2019ve probably learned about how these countries and their national governments are engaged in\u00a0a nefarious\u00a0conspiracy to collectively surveil, monitor, and control the mass communications of the entire globe (or at least the citizens located in those countries). While this dramatic\u00a0narrative\u00a0is certainly\u00a0attention-catching, the reality is much more mundane.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Five Eyes3<\/sup> (FVEY) was established unofficially in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, during World War II, as a multilateral agreement for cooperation in intelligence gathering between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US. Intelligence sharing became even more crucial during the Cold War, with the growing need to monitor Soviet Union communications and carry out code-breaking measures.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n In present day, the FVEY is primarily concerned with matters of international criminal activity like terrorism, child abuse, human trafficking, and drug trafficking.\u00a0Given this context, the \u201cEyes\u201d organizations\u00a0aren\u2019t\u00a0concerned with\u00a0\u201cmundane\u201d issues of digital privacy and online freedom, like\u00a0monitoring\u00a0IP addresses\u00a0or\u00a0enforcing\u00a0geo-restrictions.\u00a0And, importantly, these government operations\u00a0don\u2019t\u00a0collude\u00a0with private VPN companies\u00a0in order to\u00a0complete their espionage work.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n But, in the well-known game of VPN one-upmanship, the 5, 9, and 14 Eyes became used as a marketing\u00a0message\u00a0to\u00a0disparage\u00a0VPNs\u00a0operating\u00a0in the\u00a0jurisdiction\u00a0of member countries.\u00a0This editorial fearmongering performed well given the juicy nature of espionage storytelling, but few publications cared to explain the realities of these alliances and what their surveillance work\u00a0actually\u00a0focused\u00a0on.\u00a0Nevertheless, extrapolations based on bad-faith marketing continue to\u00a0proliferate\u00a0today.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, cooperation with the \u201cEyes\u201d organizations\u00a0isn\u2019t\u00a0just limited to member countries. For example, a government agency is Panama is just as likely to\u00a0comply with\u00a0a subpoena request from a US agency, even though\u00a0they\u2019re\u00a0not an \u201cEyes\u201d country.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Take, for instance, the ProtonMail case4<\/sup> where, despite being based in Switzerland (a country with robust privacy laws, often referred to as a \u201cgold standard\u201d for consumer privacy), ProtonMail responded favorably to a warrant initiated by French authorities and logged a user\u2019s IP address after the order was affirmed by Swiss authorities.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Notably, Proton explained5<\/sup> that while ProtonMail was legally required to take this action, the same would not<\/em> be true for ProtonVPN, as email services and VPN services exist under different legal frameworks. The reasoning is this: A VPN\u2019s infrastructure (as long as it\u2019s a \u201cno-usage-logs VPN\u201d) makes this type of data request unfeasible to comply with. Indeed, this is true of no-usage-logs VPNs in Switzerland, and it\u2019s also true for no-usage-logs VPNs in the US\u2026 and it\u2019s also true of any no-usage-logs VPN in any jurisdiction with basic privacy protections.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the ProtonMail scenario goes to demonstrate that virtually all governments are happy to share data to catch criminals. There are already <\/em>many international government organizations that cooperate on intelligence sharing6<\/sup>, and they exist outside of the 5\/9\/14 Eyes Alliances.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n The bottom line is this: All legally operating VPNs, including those based in the US,\u00a0comply with\u00a0all valid, lawful government requests for data. The beautiful thing, however, is that no-usage-logs VPNs\u00a0(like Private Internet Access)\u00a0have no data to hand over.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example,\u00a0if and when\u00a0PIA\u00a0receives\u00a0subpoenas for data on our users,\u00a0and after we scrutinize the request and\u00a0validate\u00a0it as lawful,\u00a0we \u201ccomply\u201d\u00a0by handing over all the data we have;\u00a0but since we\u00a0don\u2019t\u00a0keep\u00a0usage\u00a0logs, and since all data that passes through our VPN servers is encrypted, we have no\u00a0data\u00a0to provide. We\u00a0operate\u00a0perfectly within our rights as a US-based company\u00a0not\u00a0to record any personally\u00a0identifying\u00a0information\u00a0or\u00a0keep any kind of\u00a0usage logs. And\u00a0it\u2019s\u00a0because\u00a0<\/em>we\u2019re\u00a0a US-based VPN company that\u00a0we are\u00a0allowed to\u00a0operate\u00a0like this.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Simply put, no, the US government DOES NOT make\u00a0US-based\u00a0VPNs log user data. That said, there is also a longer explanation for\u00a0why\u00a0<\/em>this is not true.\u00a0In the US today, there is no such law that requires VPN providers to log personal user data. Now, the US government may\u00a0ask<\/em>\u00a0for a VPN company to\u00a0provide\u00a0data on our customers, in which case, any no-usage-logs VPN will respectfully inform them that no such data exists.\u00a0For PIA, we neither have records of which IP addresses have accessed our servers nor any usage metric that can be linked to a customer\u2019s personal identity.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n But what if the US government wanted PIA to begin logging the activity of\u00a0particular users, much like what happened in the\u00a0ProtonMail\u00a0case? For starters, like\u00a0ProtonVPN,\u00a0we\u2019re\u00a0protected from this sort of inquiry because\u00a0we lack the infrastructure and\u00a0capacity\u00a0to\u00a0comply with\u00a0those types of requests.\u00a0In\u00a0essence,\u00a0if the government were interested in getting data on a\u00a0particular\u00a0individual,\u00a0it\u2019s\u00a0simply easier and more legally\u00a0viable\u00a0to get that data elsewhere (like from an ISP, email provider, or other business whose main charter is\u00a0not<\/em>\u00a0data privacy).\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n These points are true in every single country, whether it is a part of an \u201cEyes\u201d alliance or not. In fact, the US has some of the strongest protections against government overreach, where many other countries in the world do not. And regarding the countries that stand out by not <\/em>offering these basic protections, PIA has chosen not to host any infrastructure there7<\/sup>.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n The only way that the US government would ever decide to target a VPN company for user data would be if a high-profile criminal target had somehow evaded all other\u00a0possible means\u00a0of detection and their VPN were\u00a0the\u00a0only\u00a0feasible\u00a0way to\u00a0identify\u00a0this person (notably, NOT by logging data but by logging an IP address). But realistically, this\u00a0is\u00a0unlikely to ever\u00a0happen. Again, there are much easier ways to\u00a0ascertain\u00a0someone\u2019s digital identity without going through\u00a0a\u00a0costly and\u00a0risky\u00a0legal process to\u00a0coerce\u00a0a no-usage-logs VPN to invest in and develop the architecture needed to track down a\u00a0single\u00a0user\u2019s IP address.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n And again, importantly, this\u00a0could<\/em>\u00a0happen in any country in the world; luckily,\u00a0the fact that\u00a0consumer\u00a0protections\u00a0in the US\u00a0are\u00a0set up the way\u00a0they are\u00a0makes it nearly impossible for the US government to pursue this route.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n This myth is closely related to the\u00a0previous\u00a0one.\u00a0When\u00a0VPNs\u00a0(of any country)\u00a0are compelled to hand data over to governments\u00a0as a result of\u00a0lawful\u00a0requests, they must hand over whatever data they have. But very crucially, a US-based no-logs VPN like Private Internet Access\u00a0doesn\u2019t\u00a0have any data to hand over,\u00a0even if<\/em>\u00a0compelled to do so. This is the case for all\u00a0VPNs\u00a0with a \u2018no-logs\u2019 claim.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, you may have heard of cases of US-based VPNs handing data over to the US government8<\/sup>. These cases are all instances of companies willingly <\/em>choosing to store personal user data, whether or not they claim to do so. These companies are choosing <\/em>to keep personal user data for various reasons (like to improve their business strategy, get certain usage diagnostics, etc.). Then, when asked to turn over personal user data, they actually do <\/em>have something to hand over; they cannot use the same response that a no-logs provider like PIA can.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is incredibly crucial to note that these companies are choosing to engage in these data-collecting practices. They are\u00a0not\u00a0<\/em>being legally forced or coerced into doing so. If these companies were truly not logging\u00a0personal\u00a0user data, then they\u00a0wouldn\u2019t\u00a0have anything to give the government (as PIA consistently and routinely\u00a0proves to investigators<\/a>).\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Relatedly,\u00a0and generally speaking, US\u00a0companies and the US government are at odds with one another, with the capitalist ideal being that businesses and governments have no direct relationship, allowing businesses to exist in a \u201cfree market\u201d.\u00a0The argument that the US government is\u00a0conspiring\u00a0with a private company doesn\u2019t line up with this capitalist ideal. There is not only no \u201cworking relationship\u201d\u00a0between the government and businesses in the US, but\u00a0often times\u00a0the relationship between the government and\u00a0businesses\u00a0is\u00a0an adversarial\u00a0one.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n The point is this: The US government can\u2019t\u00a0coerce\u00a0a private company do\u00a0anything illegal, and a private VPN company whose\u00a0raison\u00a0d\u2019etre<\/em>\u00a0is\u00a0consumer\u00a0privacy\u00a0(like PIA)\u00a0is not going to comply with\u00a0government overreach.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Again, it\u2019s universally true that VPN providers must hand over user data when lawfully compelled to do so, which is why it is incredibly important to choose a VPN provider that cannot feasibly produce any data to turn over. And yes, this does have to do with being located in a privacy-friendly jurisdiction. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Luckily for companies like PIA, in the US, companies are afforded all kinds of privacy-defending rights that help US-based VPNs cater specifically to the privacy needs of\u00a0global\u00a0consumers. Aside from a proven track record of being a no-usage-logs VPN, users should also consider a few other things when evaluating VPN providers.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n For starters, free VPNs often engage in questionable privacy practices such as selling user data to advertisers in order to justify the cost of operating a VPN service9<\/sup>. After all, if you\u2019re not paying for the service, they must be generating revenue to stay in business somehow. With this behavior, free VPNs essentially subject users to the very thing that they\u2019re trying to protect themselves from when using a VPN.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Next, consider the trustworthiness and transparency of a VPN provider. Large,\u00a0publicly traded\u00a0companies (like the parent company of Private Internet Access) are subject to disclosure laws and increased scrutiny\u00a0from shareholders\u00a0and regulators.\u00a0It\u2019s\u00a0also worth considering how much a company stands to lose. Bigger companies whose sole business is in protecting user privacy often have more incentive to protect that privacy and play by the rules. As a general\u00a0\u2013\u00a0and importantly,\u00a0not absolute\u00a0\u2013\u00a0rule,\u00a0a\u00a0large,\u00a0reputable company\u00a0is\u00a0more\u00a0invested in doing business in a highly legitimate manner because they\u00a0have a\u00a0bigger reputation\u00a0to protect.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another important thing to note is if the company has an ideological commitment to fighting for digital privacy and online freedom. Companies who are loud about their engagement in privacy as an ideal (more than just a business) will be more likely to do everything in their power to defend it. For example, Private Internet Access has been actively involved in the fight for privacy and net neutrality for over a decade. We donate to\u00a0privacy-forward causes<\/a>\u00a0and we\u2019ve publicly\u00a0called out<\/a>\u00a0harmful privacy legislation and the politicians who support\u00a0them.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another thing to look for when choosing a VPN provider is a commitment to open-source software\u00a0\u2013\u00a0a hallmark of transparency in the digital world.\u00a0Some VPNs display their commitment to privacy by releasing their software for public analysis. For example, all PIA VPN apps and clients are available as 100% open-source products for users to inspect and scrutinize. In this same vein, most VPN users feel more comfortable trusting VPN providers\u00a0that\u00a0undergo regular independent security audits.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another\u00a0key metric of a trustworthy VPN is customer satisfaction. In an industry that runs on trust, companies that make every effort to protect user privacy are going to be well reviewed, and the companies that fall short can expect to have their shortcomings reflected in reviews as well. Having millions of satisfied customers\u00a0and positive things said about them in third-party reviews\u00a0is a good sign that a VPN provider is doing something right.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n But overall, when shopping for a VPN, you should look for the best set of features that suit your needs at a price you\u00a0deem\u00a0fair. Some VPNs are tailored to specific use cases\u00a0\u2013\u00a0some support more operating systems than others, or offer faster speeds, or include advanced security features like proxies, double-hop servers, and kill switches.\u00a0Finding a VPN that gives you all the functionality\u00a0you\u2019re\u00a0looking for is one of the most important aspects of choosing a VPN.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n This all goes to say that you\u00a0should<\/em>\u00a0care about the VPN provider\u2019s\u00a0jurisdiction,\u00a0as well as\u00a0the quality of service and features\u00a0you\u2019re\u00a0getting, the company\u2019s reputation, that company\u2019s commitment to user privacy, their overall customer satisfaction, and their level of transparency. These are all legitimate considerations when choosing a VPN provider.\u00a0But\u00a0there is zero reason to discredit a US-based\u00a0VPN\u00a0on jurisdiction alone.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n That\u2019s\u00a0not to say you should ignore\u00a0jurisdiction\u00a0altogether;\u00a0some countries are known for invasive privacy laws like Russia or North Korea. But, for the most part, the\u00a0jurisdiction that a VPN company is based in\u00a0(provided it\u2019s a privacy-friendly country)\u00a0will not have any direct impact on the quality of service you receive.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n We\u2019ve\u00a0touched on\u00a0some\u00a0common\u00a0myths in the VPN industry, and\u00a0we\u2019ve\u00a0presented\u00a0certain\u00a0facts to\u00a0counter these claims.\u00a0When looking at the global VPN landscape,\u00a0there\u2019s\u00a0no reason to think that a VPN company based in the US is uniquely worse than any other country in the world.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Like we mentioned, the international agreements surrounding intelligence sharing are designed to target high-profile international criminals involved in terrorism, human trafficking, and other organized crime\u00a0\u2013\u00a0and\u00a0they\u2019re\u00a0not\u00a0relevant when it comes to\u00a0maintaining a\u00a0VPN\u00a0service. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, most every country in the world\u00a0would willingly\u00a0participate\u00a0in intelligence sharing to\u00a0apprehend\u00a0criminals of this degree\u00a0\u2013\u00a0the \u201cEyes\u201d alliances\u00a0may initiate the search, but member countries outside the \u201cEyes\u201d will almost always comply.\u00a0But again, this does not mean, however, that \u201cEyes\u201d alliance countries are conspiring to track the IP addresses of those using a VPN to, for example, access region-specific content\u00a0or hide data from an ISP or network admin.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Importantly,\u00a0not only is the US\u00a0not\u00a0<\/em>a dangerous place to base a VPN company,\u00a0it\u00a0actually\u00a0offers\u00a0freedoms and protections that are\u00a0largely unmatched\u00a0almost anywhere else in the world\u00a0\u2013\u00a0and the general stability of the US government means these laws are not likely to change anytime soon. The United States does not, and legally\u00a0cannot<\/em>, compel private companies that are structured like Private Internet Access to collect and log information about their users. The US has some of the strongest protections in the world against this type of governmental coercion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n And this is all\u00a0evident\u00a0in Private Internet Access\u2019s proven\u00a0track record\u00a0in court. When forced to testify in a court of law, we have,\u00a0time and time again, been completely incapable of producing any personal data about any of our users.\u00a0And\u00a0it\u2019s\u00a0because<\/em>\u00a0we\u2019re\u00a0based in the US that\u00a0we\u2019re\u00a0able to\u00a0operate\u00a0like this.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n It\u2019s\u00a0time we finally\u00a0scrutinize and\u00a0discredit\u00a0these myths about US-based VPN providers.\u00a0The claims about US VPNs detailed in this article are mostly rooted in fallacious, ill-reasoned arguments,\u00a0or straight-up false equivalencies.\u00a0On paper, some of these espionage conspiracies make for a juicy narrative,\u00a0and\u00a0many VPN providers and affiliates have piggybacked on\u00a0it\u00a0to\u00a0disparage\u00a0the competition\u2026\u00a0but in reality, none\u00a0of it is\u00a0truthful.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n As has always been the case, and always will be for the\u00a0foreseeable future, the United States\u00a0is the land of the free\u00a0\u2013\u00a0the US Constitution provides individuals and corporations with maximum legal footing to stand up against government forces, surveillance, and intrusions of privacy.\u00a0And\u00a0these freedoms are\u00a0something all US citizens take\u00a0very<\/em>\u00a0seriously.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n For these reasons, Private Internet Access benefits significantly from being based in the United States, where we are best positioned to continue championing our users\u2019 right to digital privacy and online freedom.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n References<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nMyth #1:\u00a0All This Sensationalist\u00a0Reporting\u00a0Exists\u00a0for\u00a0Good Reason\u00a0<\/h2>\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.privateinternetaccess.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/reporter-g0f09ad2b6_1920-1024x768.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nMyth #2: The \u201cEyes\u201d Alliances Are Shadowy Organizations Built\u00a0to\u00a0Erode Privacy\u00a0\u00a0<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.privateinternetaccess.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/eagle-g26645bb4e_1920-872x1024.jpg\")
<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\nMyth #3: The US Government Makes VPNs Log User Data<\/h2>\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.privateinternetaccess.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/artificial-intelligence-g02a21961e_1920-1024x685.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nMyth #4: The US Government Makes VPNs Forfeit User Data (Sort of True, But Very Misleading)\u00a0<\/h2>\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.privateinternetaccess.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/police-g9fc887e70_1920-1024x683.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nMyth #5: All VPN Providers Are Created Equal\u00a0<\/h2>\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.privateinternetaccess.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/scale-gcf6120b08_1920-1024x569.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nFact: The US May Actually Be\u00a0a\u00a0Safer Jurisdiction\u00a0for\u00a0VPNs<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.privateinternetaccess.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/statue-of-liberty-gc8ce88eb2_1920-1024x683.jpg\")
<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n\n